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Assignment feedback in school choice mechanisms

<p>This paper experimentally investigates the provision of real-time feedback about school assignments during the preference reporting period in three widely employed mechanisms: deferred acceptance, top trading cycles, and the Boston mechanism. Adaptive models predict that greater sensitivity to tentative assignments during the reporting period will produce more equilibrium assignments in all three mechanisms. Consistent with adaptive predictions, real-time assignment feedback consistently increased equilibrium assignments but did not increase truthful reporting. These findings suggest that providing feedback about assignments during the preference reporting period could help student assignment mechanisms more reliably achieve policy goals.</p>

ShareScore

36/100

Overall dataset sharing score

Score breakdown

These five areas show where the dataset supports — or may limit — practical reuse.

Stewardship
0
Harmonization
12
Access
12
Reuse readiness
0
Engagement
12

Dataset details

Repository
dryad
Published
December 31, 2021
License
cc-zero
DOI
10.5061/dryad.r7sqv9sfk

Scored with release 0.9.0

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