Assignment feedback in school choice mechanisms
<p>This paper experimentally investigates the provision of real-time feedback about school assignments during the preference reporting period in three widely employed mechanisms: deferred acceptance, top trading cycles, and the Boston mechanism. Adaptive models predict that greater sensitivity to tentative assignments during the reporting period will produce more equilibrium assignments in all three mechanisms. Consistent with adaptive predictions, real-time assignment feedback consistently increased equilibrium assignments but did not increase truthful reporting. These findings suggest that providing feedback about assignments during the preference reporting period could help student assignment mechanisms more reliably achieve policy goals.</p>
ShareScore
36/100
Overall dataset sharing score
Score breakdown
These five areas show where the dataset supports — or may limit — practical reuse.
- Stewardship
- 0
- Harmonization
- 12
- Access
- 12
- Reuse readiness
- 0
- Engagement
- 12
Dataset details
- Repository
- dryad
- Published
- December 31, 2021
- License
- cc-zero
- DOI
- 10.5061/dryad.r7sqv9sfk
Scored with release 0.9.0
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