Ground, Object and Interpretant

<p><strong>Ground, Object and Interpretant</strong></p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another name for <em><strong>semiotic</strong></em> ({s&eacute;mei&ouml;tik&eacute;}), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as &quot;quasi-necessary,&quot; or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what <em><strong>must be</strong></em> the characters of all signs used by a &quot;scientific&quot; intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience. As to that process of abstraction, it is itself a sort of observation. The faculty which I call abstractive observation is one which ordinary people perfectly recognize, but for which the theories of philosophers sometimes hardly leave room. It is a familiar experience to every human being to wish for something quite beyond his present means, and to follow that wish by the question, &quot;Should I wish for that thing just the same, if I had ample means to gratify it?&quot; To answer that question, he searches his heart, and in doing so makes what I term an abstractive observation. He makes in his imagination a sort of skeleton diagram, or outline sketch, of himself, considers what modifications the hypothetical state of things would require to be made in that picture, and then examines it, that is, <em><strong>observes</strong></em> what he has imagined, to see whether the same ardent desire is there to be discerned. By such a process, which is at bottom very much like mathematical reasoning, we can reach conclusions as to what <em><strong>would be</strong></em> true of signs in all cases, so long as the intelligence using them was scientific. The modes of thought of a God, who should possess an intuitive omniscience superseding reason, are put out of the question. Now the whole process of development among the community of students of those formulations by abstractive observation and reasoning of the truths which <em><strong>must</strong></em> hold good of all signs used by a scientific intelligence is an observational science, like any other positive science, notwithstanding its strong contrast to all the special sciences which arises from its aiming to find out what <em><strong>must be</strong></em> and not merely what <em><strong>is</strong></em> in the actual world. Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. by Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958), 2.227.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>A sign, or <em><strong>representamen</strong></em>, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the <em><strong>interpretant</strong></em> of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its <em><strong>object</strong></em>. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the <em><strong>ground</strong></em> of the representamen. &quot;Idea&quot; is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches another man&#39;s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is to have a <em><strong>like</strong></em> content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant of the interval a new idea. <em>Ibid, </em>2.228.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>In consequence of every representamen being thus connected with three things, the ground, the object, and the interpretant, the science of semiotic has three branches. The first is called by Duns Scotus <em><strong>grammatica speculativa</strong></em>. We may term it <em><strong>pure grammar</strong></em>. It has for its task to ascertain what must be true of the representamen used by every scientific intelligence in order that they may embody any <em><strong>meaning</strong></em>. The second is logic proper. It is the science of what is quasi-necessarily true of the representamina of any scientific intelligence in order that they may hold good of any <em><strong>object</strong></em>, that is, may be true. Or say, logic proper is the formal science of the conditions of the truth of representations. The third, in imitation of Kant&#39;s fashion of preserving old associations of words in finding nomenclature for new conceptions, I call <em><strong>pure rhetoric</strong></em>. Its task is to ascertain the laws by which in every scientific intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings forth another. <em>Ibid, </em>2.229.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Written c. 1897</p>