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49 results for “Punishment”
The cost of noise: Stochastic punishment falls short of sustaining cooperation in social dilemma experiments
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The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics
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Social norms and cultural diversity in the development of third-party punishment
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Data from: Group-size dependent punishment of idle subordinates in a cooperative breeder where helpers pay to stay
In cooperative breeding systems, dominant breeders sometimes tolerate unrelated individuals even if they inflict costs on the dominants. According to the 'pay-to-stay' hypothesis, (i) subordinates can outweigh these costs by providing help and (ii) dominants should be able to enforce help by punishing subordinates that provide insufficient help. This requires that dominants can monitor helping and can recognize group members individually. In a field experiment, we tested whether cooperatively breeding cichlid Neolamprologus pulcher subordinates increase their help after a forced 'idle' period, how other group members respond to a previously idle helper, and how helper behaviour and group responses depend on group size. Previously, idle helpers increased their submissiveness and received more aggression than control helpers, suggesting that punishment occurred to enforce help. Subordinates in small groups increased their help more than those in large groups, despite receiving less aggression. When subordinates were temporarily removed, dominants in small groups were more likely to evict returning subordinates. Our results suggest that only in small groups do helpers face a latent threat of punishment by breeders as predicted by the pay-to-stay hypothesis. In large groups, cognitive constraints may prevent breeders from tracking the behaviour of a large number of helpers.
Data from: Dispositional free riders do not free ride on punishment
Strong reciprocity explains prosocial cooperation by the presence of individuals who incur costs to help those who helped them ('strong positive reciprocity') and to punish those who wronged them ('strong negative reciprocity'). Theories of social preferences predict that in contrast to 'strong reciprocators', self-regarding people cooperate and punish only if there are sufficient future benefits. Here, we test this prediction in a two-stage design. First, participants are classified according to their disposition towards strong positive reciprocity as either dispositional conditional cooperators (DCC) or dispositional free riders (DFR). Participants then play a one-shot public goods game, either with or without punishment. As expected, DFR cooperate only when punishment is possible, whereas DCC cooperate without punishment. Surprisingly, dispositions towards strong positive reciprocity are unrelated to strong negative reciprocity: punishment by DCC and DFR is practically identical. The 'burden of cooperation' is thus carried by a larger set of individuals than previously assumed.
Replication package for: "Strategic conformity or anticonformity to avoid punishment and attract reward".
<p>Replication package for: Dvorak, F., Fischbacher, U., and Schmelz, K. (2024). "Strategic conformity or anticonformity to avoid punishment and attract reward", The Economic Journal.</p>
A Brief Multimedia Program Affects Parents' Attitudes Toward Physical Punishment
ClinicalTrials.gov study NCT01459510. IPD Sharing: Not stated. Countries: 1. Publications: 3.
Data from: Antisocial punishment across societies
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Data from: Dispositional free riders do not free ride on punishment
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Data from: Large-scale cooperation driven by reputation, not fear of divine punishment
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Data from: Group-size dependent punishment of idle subordinates in a cooperative breeder where helpers pay to stay
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Data from: Why hate the good guy? Antisocial punishment of high cooperators is greater when people compete to be chosen
When choosing social partners, people prefer good cooperators (all else equal). Given this preference, anyone wishing to be chosen can either increase their own cooperation to become more desirable, or suppress others' cooperation to make them less desirable. Previous research shows that very cooperative people sometimes get punished ("antisocial punishment") or criticized ("do-gooder derogation") in many cultures. Here we use a public goods game with punishment to test whether antisocial punishment is used as a means of competing to be chosen by suppressing others' cooperation. As predicted, there was more antisocial punishment when participants were competing to be chosen for a subsequent cooperative task (a Trust Game) than without a subsequent task. This difference in antisocial punishment cannot be explained by differences in contributions, moralistic punishment, or confusion. This suggests that antisocial punishment is a social strategy that low cooperators use to avoid looking bad when high cooperators escalate cooperation.
Data from: To help or punish in the face of unfairness: men and women prefer mutually-beneficial strategies over punishment in a sexual selection context
There is evidence that the evolution of cooperation is, in part, maintained through sexual selection. Supporting this, within a female choice model, men display mutually-beneficial behaviour to attract women, and women prefer men who do so. This evidence is based on a 2-choice -architecture (cooperate or not). Here we extend this to include punishment options within a 4-choice-architecture ('punishing a transgressor', 'compensating a victim', 'both punishing and compensating' or 'doing-nothing'). Both compensation (a self-serving mutually-beneficial behaviour) and self-serving punishment, are associated with positive mate qualities. We test which is preferred by males and which is chosen by female undergraduates in a sexual selection context. We further explore effects of trait empathy and political ideology on these preferences. In a series of three studies using a third-party-punishment-compensation (3PPC) game we show (Study One), that romantically-primed undergraduate males, express a preference to either 'compensate' or 'both compensate and punish', and undergraduate women find males who 'compensate' or 'compensate and punish' the most attractive (Studies Two and Three). Compensating men are perceived as compassionate, fair and strong by undergraduate women (Study Three). High trait empathy (Studies One and Three) and a left-wing political ideology (Study Three) are associated with a preference for compensation. Thus, self-serving mutually-beneficial behaviour can be preferred over self-serving punishment as a signal of mate quality in undergraduates. Implications for the evolution of cooperation are discussed with respect to sexual selection.
Data from: Male monkeys use punishment and coercion to de-escalate costly intergroup fights
In numerous social species, males direct aggression towards female group members during intergroup fights, and this behaviour is commonly thought to function as mate guarding, even though males often target non-receptive females. In studying intergroup fights in a wild population of vervet monkeys, we found that male intragroup aggression was primarily directed towards individuals who had either just finished exhibiting, or were currently attempting to instigate intergroup aggression. Targeted females were less likely to instigate intergroup aggression in the future, indicating that male intragroup aggression functioned as coercion (when directed towards those who were currently trying to instigate a fight) and punishment (when directed towards those who had recently fought). These manipulative tactics effectively prevented intergroup encounters from escalating into fights and often de-escalated ongoing conflicts. Males who were likely sires were those most likely to use punishment/coercion, particularly when they were wounded, and therefore less able to protect vulnerable offspring should a risky intergroup fight erupt. This work, along with our previous finding that females use punishment and rewards to recruit males into participating in intergroup fights, highlights the inherent conflict of interest that exists between the sexes, as well as the role that social incentives can play in resolving this conflict. Furthermore, unlike other studies which have found punishment to be used asymmetrically between partners, these works represent a novel example of reciprocal punishment in a non-human animal.
Data from: Punishment as a means of competition: implications for strong reciprocity theory
Strong negative reciprocity, that is, sanctions imposed on norm violators at the punisher's own expense, has powerful cooperation-enhancing effects in both real-life and experimental game situations. However, it is plausible that punishment may obtain alternative roles depending on social context and the personality characteristics of participants. We examined the occurrence of punishing behavior among 80 subjects in a strongly competitive Public Goods game setting. Despite the punishment condition, the amount of the contributions decreased steadily during the game. The amount of contributions had no significant effect on received and imposed punishments. The results indicate that certain social contexts (in this case, intensive competition) exert modifying effects on the role that punishment takes on. Subjects punished each other in order to achieve a higher rank and a financially better outcome. Punishment primarily functioned as a means of rivalry, instead of as a way of second-order cooperation, as strong reciprocity suggests. These results indicate the need for the possible modification of the social conditions of punishment mechanisms described by the strong reciprocity theory as an evolutionary explanation of human cooperation.
Data from: Patient and impatient punishers of free-riders
Costly punishment of cheaters who contribute little or nothing to a cooperating group has been extensively studied as an effective means to enforce cooperation. The prevailing view is that individuals use punishment to retaliate against transgressions of moral standards like fairness or equity. However, there is much debate regarding the psychological underpinnings of costly punishment. Some authors suggest that costly punishment must be a product of humans' capacity for reasoning, self-control, and long-term planning, while others argue that it is the result of an impulsive, present oriented, emotional drive. Here we explore the inter-temporal preferences of punishers in a multilateral cooperation game and show that both interpretations might be right as we can identify two different types of punishment: punishment of free-riders by cooperators, which is predicted by patience (future orientation) and free-riders' punishment of other free-riders, which is predicted by impatience (present orientation). Therefore, the picture is more complex as punishment by free-riders unlikely comes from a reaction against a moral transgression, but instead from a competitive, spiteful drive. Thus, punishment grounded on morals may be related to lasting or delayed psychological incentives, while punishment triggered by competitive desires may be linked to short-run aspirations. These results indicate that the individual's time horizon is relevant for the type of social behaviour she opts for. Integrating such differences in inter-temporal preferences and the social behaviour of agents might help to achieve a better understanding of how human cooperation and punishment behaviour has evolved.
Narrative Analysis of the Relationships between the Religious Perception of Serious Violent Offenders and their Perception of their Punishment
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Psychology of Reward and Punishment: Functional and Molecular Brain Imaging and Monoaminergic Correlates
ClinicalTrials.gov study NCT00865332. IPD Sharing: Not stated. Countries: 1. Publications: 3.
Data from: Punishment as a means of competition: implications for strong reciprocity theory
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Data from: Coevolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching in repeated interactions
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